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JUDICIAL CAUTION AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S LABOR DECISIONS,
OCTOBER TERM 1971t
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
Labor law, like most other law in the making, is intensely
political at its margins. On certain central themes, such as the
right to join a union and freedom of contract, judges and adminis-
trators of widely varying outlooks may be able to reach a con-
sensus. But along the frontiers of the law, no such accord can be
expected. Conscientious decision-makers will inevitably differ
with one another, depending on their diverse social values. They
may even differ with their own prior positions, depending on shifts
in the political climate. Moreover, if the decision-makers happen
to be justices of the United States, Supreme Court, that most
institutional of judicial bodies, they cannot help but be differently
influenced from time to time by the changing interaction among
the Court's changing membership.
In the labor field, as elsewhere, a hallmark of the Warren Court
was a bold inventiveness, even at the risk of some damage to the
original congressional (or constitutional) design. A hallmark of the
Burger Court, it becomes increasingly clear, is going to be a
resurgence of traditional lawyerly skills and lawyerly cautious-
ness-even at the risk of some stunting of the growth of creative
legal theory. All these characteristics are exhibited in the Su-
preme Court's labor law decisions of the past year, especially in
the three I consider the most significant. Those are NLRB v.
Burns International Security Services, Inc.,1 dealing with the obli-
gations of "successor" employers; Chemical & Alkali Workers
t The text is that of a speech presented on August 14, 1972, to the Labor Relations Law
Section of the American Bar Association at the Annual Meeting of the Association in San
Francisco, California. This speech also appears in the Report of the 1972 Proceedings of
the Labor Relations Law Section, and is reproduced here with the permission of the
American Bar Association.
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Secretary, Section
of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association. A.B., 1951, Fordham College; J.D.,
1954, University of Michigan.
1406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,2 dealing with the scope of
mandatory bargaining subjects; and Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 3 dealing with the right of a union to solicit employees on
company parking lots.
1. BURNS AND SUCCESSORSHIP
Corporate mergers and acquisitions have become an American
way of business. 4 Their increasing frequency underscores the
practical importance of the Supreme Court's efforts in the Burns
case to spell out the collective bargaining obligations of a surviv-
ing or "successor" employer. Yet ironically the first, and perhaps
the most critical, point to be made about Burns is that it hardly
represents a typical successorship situation, if indeed it can fairly
be called a successorship case at all.
Wackenhut had a contract to provide protection services at a
Lockheed plant. In March, 1967, the United Plant Guards (UPG)
were certified as the bargaining agent of the Wackenhut guards at
Lockheed, and in late April the UPG and Wackenhut entered into
a three-year collective bargaining agreement. Meanwhile, Lock-
heed solicited bids for a new guard contract, to begin July 1. At a
prebid conference attended by Burns, among others, Lockheed
informed the bidders of the UPG's certification and of its contract
with Wackenhut. Both Wackenhut and Burns submitted esti-
mates, and Lockheed accepted Burns's bid at the end of May.
Burns retained twenty-seven of the Wackenhut guards, and
brought in fifteen of its own guards from elsewhere. At the same
time, Burns informed the former Wackenhut employees that they
would have to join the American Federation of Guards (AFG),
another union having contracts with Burns at other locations. On
June 29, Burns recognized the AFG as the bargaining representa-
tive. On July 12, however, the UPG demanded that Burns recog-
nize it and honor the collective bargaining agreement between the
UPG and Wackenhut. When Burns refused, the UPG filed unfair
labor practice charges.
The National Labor Relations Board found Burns had violated
Subsection 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act 5 by un-
2404 U.S. 157 (1971).
3407 U.S. 539 (1972).
4The number of corporate mergers and acquisitions annually more than doubled be-
tween 1961 and 1969, although there was a decline in 1970. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 474 (Table No. 744)
(92d ed.).
, Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in the text are to the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
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lawfully assisting and recognizing the AFG,6 and this routine
finding was not thereafter contested by Burns. 7 Next, the Board,
relying on a long line of cases holding that a mere change of
employers or of ownership does not affect a certification if a
majority of the employees of the first employer are retained by the
new management," ruled that Burns had violated Subsection
8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the UPG. 9 Then,
in a reversal of a considerable body of precedent, 10 the Board
went on to hold that Burns, as the "successor" employer in the
Lockheed guard unit, was bound by the substantive terms of the
collective agreement between the "predecessor" employer, Wack-
enhut, and the UPG, and that Burns's failure to "honor" the
contract was likewise a violation of Subsection 8(a)(5). 1
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court sustained
(5-4) the Board's view that Burns had to recognize and bargain
with the UPG, but rejected (9-0) the notion Burns also had to
assume the Wackenhut contract. On the duty to bargain, Justice
White emphasized that a "majority of these employees" who had
voted "a few months before" for the union had been hired by
Burns for work in an "identical unit." 12 He observed that it would
be a "wholly different case" if (1) Burns's operational structure
and practices differed from those of Wackenhut, so as to make the
Lockheed bargaining unit no longer appropriate, or (2) Burns had,
without any unlawful discrimination, hired employees not already
represented by a certified union.'3 It was noted that both Burns
and Wackenhut were nationwide organizations, performing identi-
cal services at the same facility. Only the supervisory personnel
were different. Beyond this, Justice White seemed content to
rely upon lower court precedent to justify a bargaining order in
6 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 348-49 (1970).
7 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1971).
8 See, e.g., South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), enforced sub nor.
NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. Downtown Bakery
Corp., 330 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1964).
9 182 N.L.R.B. at 349.
10 See, e.g., Matter of ILWU (Juneau Spruce), 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949), enforced, 189
F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'don other grounds, 342 U.S. 237 (1952); Rohlik, Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n. 15 (1964).
11 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
12 406 U.S. at 278. It is unclear whether Justice White considers the critical "majority"
to be (I) a majority of the predecessor's employees going into the successor's work force,
or (2) a majority of the successor's work force coming from the predecessor employer, or
(3) both. NLRB counsel apparently thought neither majority was essential ("a substantial
number [of the predecessor's employees] ... enough to give you a continuity of employ-
ment conditions in the bargaining unit"), although in Burns both majorities seem to have
been present. Id. at 281 n.6.
13 Id. at 280.
WINTER 19731
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favor of an "incumbent" union "where the bargaining unit re-
mains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the
new employer are represented by a newly certified bargaining
agent." 14
In denying the UPG's contract claims, Justice White laid
primary emphasis on the congressional policy of promoting the
bargaining freedom of employers and unions.15 He also argued
that holding either union or employer to the substantive terms of
an old collective agreement could result in serious inequities. 16 A
potential buyer, for example, might be willing to take over a
moribund business only if he could make substantial changes in
employment practices. Burns, it was stressed, did not consent to
be covered by the Wackenhut contract.
Justice White's analysis obviously raises the possibility of a
conflict with the Court's earlier decision in John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston.'7 There the surviving employer in a two-party
merger was ordered to arbitrate the extent to which it was bound
by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union and
the predecessor employer that had disappeared in the merger.
Justice White listed several reasons for distinguishing Wiley &
Sons from Burns, 8 most of which seem far from convincing.
Wiley, he said, involved a Section 30119 suit to compel arbitration,
not an unfair labor practice proceeding like Burns. But in recent
years the Supreme Court has been willing to sanction the Board's
increasing intervention into the area of contract enforcement un-
der the rubric of remedying refusals to bargain. Thus, in NLRB v.
Strong,20 the Supreme Court approved a Board order requiring an
employer to sign and acknowledge a labor contract negotiated on
his behalf by a multiemployer association, and to pay fringe ben-
efits to union trust funds in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The Supreme Court, in my opinion, should properly
keep the NLRB out of the business of adjudicating individual
contract claims under collective bargaining agreements, con-
signing them instead to the courts or arbitrators.2' At the same
14 Id. at 281. Contrast the use of the term "majority" here with that in the text
accompanying note 12 supra. See also The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1,252-54.
15406 U.S. at 282-84. See, e.g., H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
16 406 U.S. at 287-88.
17376 U.S. 543 (1964).
18406 U.S. at 285-87.
19 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
20 393 U.S. 357 (1969). See also NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360 (1969); St. Antoine, A Touchstone for
Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1968). Cf. Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
[VOL. 6:269
HeinOnline  -- 6 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 272 1972-1973
Supreme Court Labor Decisions
time the Court is apparently quite prepared, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, to let the Board exercise concurrent jurisdiction with
courts and arbitrators when the issue raised goes to the very
existence of a contract or its applicability to a particular employer.
In addition to emphasizing that Wiley was a Section 301 case
and not an unfair labor practice proceeding, Justice White de-
clared that Wiley dealt directly only with the duty to arbitrate, and
not with the ultimate question of whether the surviving company
was bound by any substantive terms of the preexisting contract.22
That is correct. But surely it would have been anomalous to
require arbitration in Wiley unless the Court was ready to enter-
tain the possibility that the arbitrator might render an enforceable
substantive award. Despite Justice White's veiled suggestions to
the contrary, therefore, I do not think the result in Burns would
have been different if the case had reached the Supreme Court as
a Section 301 suit, either to secure arbitration or to enforce an
arbitral award.
A further, rather curious, comment is made that Wiley occurred
against a background of state law embodying the rule that the
surviving corporation in a merger is liable for the obligations of
the disappearing corporation.2 3 I should have thought that Lincoln
Mills2 4 and its progeny had long since made federal law con-
trolling to the exclusion of state law in the determination of rights
and obligations under labor contracts. Perhaps Justice White
meant that state law can be helpful in ascertaining the parties'
intent and their actual or constructive agreements. For after the
reference to state law he immediately proceeded to what I consid-
er the most solid basis for distinguishing Wiley from Burns: "Here
there was no merger, no sale of assets, and there were no dealings
whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns. On the contrary, they
were competitors for the same work .... "25 Justice White then
concluded that the mere hiring of Wackenhut employees was a
"wholly insufficient basis for implying either in fact or in law that
Burns had agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor Wack-
enhut's collective-bargaining contract."2 6
In a final portion of its opinion, the Court held, again unani-
mously, that Burns did not have to reimburse its employees on the
theory it had unilaterally changed the terms of the old Wackenhut
22406 U.S. at 285-86.
23 Id. at 286.24 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25 406 U.S. at 286.
26 Id. at 287.
WINTER 19731
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contract without bargaining with the United Plant Guards. 27 The
NLRB's long standing general rule has been that whether or not a
successor employer is bound by its predecessor's contract, it must
not institute terms of employment different from those in that
contract without first bargaining with the employees' representa-
tive. 8 In this respect the successor employer would be in the
same position as employers generally during the period between
collective bargaining agreements. Justice White was prepared to
concede that when a new employer plans to retain all the employ-
ees in a unit, he should "consult" with the employees' union
before he fixes the terms of employment.29 But Justice White
went on to say that in other situations it may not be clear until the
successor has hired his full complement of employees that he has
a duty to bargain with the union as a majority representative.
Under this reasoning, Burns's obligation to bargain did not mature
until it had selected its force of guards late in June. It was thus
free to set the initial terms on which it would hire its employees.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Brennan,
and Justice Powell, dissented from the majority's conclusion that
Burns was under a statutory obligation to bargain with the UPG.
First, he argued, it was not mathematically demonstrable that a
majority of Burns's forty-two employees wanted the UPG as their
bargaining representative.30 There was no evidence even as to the
individual sentiments of the twenty-seven employees coming from
Wackenhut, let alone of the fifteen remaining employees of Burns.
Justice Rehnquist further criticized the Board for automatically
accepting Wackenhut's unit at Lockheed as appropriate for Burns,
especially in the face of evidence that Burns regularly transferred
employees from job to job, and had never bargained with a union
consisting of employees at a single location. 31 On both the ques-
tions of majority representation and appropriate unit, Justice
Rehnquist insisted that the majority decision could be sustained, if
at all, only by resort to the doctrine of "successorship."
27 Id. at 295-96. After the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Burns, a dispute
arose as to whether this issue was even properly before the Court. On October 10, 1972,
the Supreme Court denied a motion to recall judgment in the case. - U.S. -, 34 L. Ed.
2d 74.28 See, e.g., Overnite Transportation Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372
F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967).
29406 U.S. at 294-95. Burns has since been interpreted by the NLRB as authorizing
the findings of an 8(a)(5) violation when a successor employer that has retained all the unit
employees unilaterally changes the terms in the predecessor's contract without prior
bargaining with the incumbent union. Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80
L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972).
30406 U.S. at 297.
31 Id. at 297-98.
274 (VOL. 6:269
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Thereupon, Justice Rehnquist launched a bristling attack on the
application of successorship doctrine to the Burns situation.32 The
concept of successorship finds support, he said, in the need to
grant employees some protection against a sudden transformation
in their employer's business, which results in the substitution of a
new legal entity but leaves intact significant elements of the for-
mer business. There must be continuity in the enterprise, as well
as change, he maintained, and that continuity must be at least
partially on the employer's side, and not wholly on the employ-
ees'. Burns, he pointed out, had acquired no assets, tangible or
intangible, by negotiation or transfer from Wackenhut. It suc-
ceeded to the Lockheed service contract over Wackenhut's vigor-
ous opposition. In short, in Justice Rehnquist's view, Burns was
not a successor of Wackenhut, and should not be subject to
Wackenhut's bargaining obligations on the basis of the successor-
ship doctrine.
On the facts of Burns, Justice Rehnquist's analysis seems the
more persuasive. Merely at the semantic level-which is often
helpful because of what it tells us about the reasonable ex-
pectations of interested parties-it is hard to avoid feeling that
"rival" or "competitor" is much more apt than "successor" to
describe the relationship of Burns to Wackenhut. More substan-
tively, it would appear that employees and their union should be
entitled, with regard to either bargaining or contract rights, to
consider themselves protected only against those changes in
which their employer in some way participates. He may partici-
pate actively by merging or selling his business, or passively by
being declared bankrupt, but at least there should be some in-
volvement by the original entity with which the union bargained
or contracted. It was, after all, only his stature, his prospects, his
assets that the union could sensibly have relied on. Moreover,
both bargaining status and labor contracts denote relationships;
they have an employer quotient as well as a union-employee
quotient. To transfer rights and duties, a nexus would seem neces-
sary at the employer as well as the union-employee end of the
relationship. Allowing the bare movement of employees from one
employer to another to carry along either bargaining or contract
rights and obligations ignores the employer side of the relation-
ship. 33
32 Id. at 307- 10.
33 A strong argument to the contrary is presented in a most comprehensive and thought-
ful study of the successorship problem by Professor Stephen B. Goldberg of Illinois, The
Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735, 749-50,
805-06 (1969).
WINTER 1973]
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Justice Rehnquist also assumes a more logical stance than the
majority in Burns by deciding both the bargaining issue and the
contract issue the same way. Despite the considerable amount of
Board precedent to the contrary, I am satisfied that in most of
these successorship cases, bargaining rights and contract rights
should stand together or fall together. The same considerations of
employee free choice, industrial stability, flexibility of business
arrangements, and so on, that militate for or against the survival
of bargaining rights also militate for or against the survival of
contract rights. Justice Rehnquist's distaste for "unwarranted ri-
gidity" in labor relations will probably lead him to be chary about
the survival of rights in most cases. If Justice White meant what
he said in stating that Burns turned on its "precise facts," 34
however, the door has been left open for the Court to distinguish
Burns in some of the more typical successorship situations of sale
or merger, and to find the predecessor's contract binding on a true
successor.a
5
Even though Burns and Wiley are reconcilable in theory, their
approaches are plainly divergent. Both Justice White and Justice
Rehnquist in Burns speak in terms that would sound familiar in
the mouth of a traditional Willistonian -for example, the need for
"consent" under "normal contract principles," and the question of
whether certain rights and duties were "in fact" "assigned" or
"assumed." This is a far cry from the attitude in Wiley. There the
Court stressed that "a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract," but a " 'generalized code' " setting forth " 'the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.' "36
A predecessor's labor contract, according to Wiley, could bind the
successor employer where there is "substantial continuity of iden-
tity in the business enterprise," 37 without regard to the existence
of actual consent. Wiley thus boldly relied on the force of the
federal labor statutes to impose contractual obligations on an
unconsenting successor; in contrast, Burns refocused attention on
common law notions of individual assent.
On a still deeper level, Burns reflects a clash between certain
fundamental values in the labor field. On the one hand, there is a
34406 U.S. at 274: "Resolution turns to a great extent on the precise facts involved
here."
35 The NLRB, with little if any analysis, is apparently going to read Burns broadly for
the proposition that a successor employer is not required to assume the contractual
obligations of the predecessor. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80
L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972).36 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964), quoting in part from
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960).
37 376 U.S. at 551.
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concern about protecting employees against a sudden and unfore-
seen loss of bargaining and contract rights. There is also a con-
cern about maintaining industrial stability and labor peace,
through reducing the number of representation elections and sus-
taining the life of labor agreements. On the other hand, stress is
laid on the freedom and voluntariness of the collective bargaining
process, on the importance of saddling neither unions nor employ-
ers with substantive contract terms to which they have not
agreed. Stress is further laid on providing maximum flexibility in
business arrangements, so that employers may respond to chang-
ing market conditions without being straitjacketed by the bargain-
ing or contractual obligations that may have been assumed by
imprudent predecessors. The future development of successorship
law undoubtedly depends far more on the way the members of the
Supreme Court ultimately balance out these competing values
than on any logical deductions from Wiley and Burns.
I1. PITTSBURGH PLATE AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
The Supreme Court once more had to struggle with defining the
scope of the duty to bargain in Chemical & Alkali Workers Local
I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 8 A union and an employer had a
group health insurance plan in which retired employees could
participate. When Medicare 9 was enacted, the union sought mid-
term bargaining to renegotiate the insurance benefits for retired
employees. The employer disputed the union's right to bargain on
behalf of the retirees. Eventually, over the union's objections, the
employer wrote each retired employee, offering to pay a supple-
mental Medicare premium if the employee would withdraw from
the negotiated plan. After fifteen of 190 retirees elected to accept
this proposal, the union filed unfair labor practices with the
NLRB. The Board found the employer had refused to bargain and
had unilaterally changed terms of employment, contrary to Sub-
sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.40
Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held
there was no violation of Subsection 8(a)(5), rejecting all the
various grounds for the Labor Board's decision. First, the Board
had ruled that the retirees were themselves "employees" within
the meaning of the Act, so that their benefits were a "term and
38404 U.S. 157 (1971).
3942 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L.
89-97, 79 Stat. 291).
40 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 911 (1969).
WINTER 1973]
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condition" of their own employment.41 The Court dismissed this
view, stating that Subsection 2(3)'s definition of "employee" is
limited to "working" persons, and does not cover those who have
retired from the work force.42 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
the retirees did not share a community of interest with active
workers substantial enough to justify their inclusion in the bar-
gaining unit; even the Board denied them the right to vote in
representation elections. 43
Alternatively, the Board had held that the pensioners' benefits
were a mandatory subject of bargaining44 on the theory that they
"vitally" affected the "terms and conditions of employment" of
the active employees, principally by influencing the value of their
current and future benefits.45 In keeping with its precedents in the
Oliver46 and Fibreboard47 cases, the Supreme Court agreed that
there are occasional exceptions to the normal rule that matters
involving individuals outside the employment relationship do not
fall within the category of mandatory bargaining subjects under
Subsection 8(d). The Labor Board had correctly stated the "vital
effect" test for these exceptions, but had wrongly applied it. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Board's assessment that the
retirees' benefits "vitally" affected the active employees, con-
cluding that the advantage to the latter of including retired em-
ployees under the same health insurance contract was "specula-
tive and insubstantial at best."48
Lastly, the Court ruled that the employer did not violate Sub-
section 8(a)(5) by offering the retirees an exchange for their with-
drawal from the already negotiated health insurance plan. 49 Even
if the proposal constituted a midterm "modification" of the con-
tract within the meaning of Subsection 8(d), said the Court, it
would have been an unfair labor practice only if it changed a term
that was a mandatory rather than a permissive subject of bargain-
ing.50 This holding is obviously significant far beyond the area of
41 Id. at 912- 14.
42 404 U.S. at 165-71.
43 Id. at 17 1- 75.
44 A "mandatory" subject is one on which either party may insist upon bargaining as a
condition of reaching agreement; negotiations can be carried to the point of "impasse," or
deadlock, on such a topic. A "permissive" subject is one on which the parties may bargain
if they both are willing, but neither party can insist on bargaining over the other's
objection. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
45 177 N.L.R.B. at 915- 16.
46 Local 24, Teamsters Union v, Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (rentals of owner-operated
trucks).
47 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (contracting out
maintenance work).
48404 U.S. at 180.49 Id. at 183-88.
50 Id. at 185.
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retirees' rights. In effect, the Court is saying that the parties to a
contract cannot convert a permissive bargaining subject into a
mandatory subject, even for the term of the contract, by including
it in their agreement. It is quite understandable that the Court, in
light of its past acceptance of the mandatory-permissive dichoto-
my, would not let the parties permanently reclassify a particular
topic. But it was surely not self-evident that the parties would be
foreclosed from voluntarily subjecting otherwise permissive mat-
ters to the statutory duties of contract execution and adminis-
tration. Nonetheless, the Court's reading is consistent with the
language of Subsection 8(d), and with the general congressional
policy of leaving contract enforcement to the courts rather than
the NLRB.51 The Court recognized, of course, that the union in
Pittsburgh Plate would have a contract action against the employ-
er if the latter's midterm modification was a breach of its agree-
ment.52
The overtones of Pittsburgh Plate may be more important than
its stated themes. During its earlier years, the so-called Kennedy-
Johnson Board reclassified a whole range of managerial deci-
sions as mandatory subjects of bargaining. 53 In Fibreboard the
Supreme Court sustained the Board in ruling that an employer
had to bargain about the decision to subcontract maintenance
work, at least where the subcontractor's employees were going to
"perform the same task in the same plant under the ultimate
control of the same employer." 54 Thereafter, however, the Board
and some courts of appeals divided over the criteria for determin-
ing mandatory subjects. The Board seemed to place primary em-
phasis on the employees' interest in avoiding "impairment of job
tenure, employment security, or reasonably anticipated work op-
portunities." 55 The courts, concerned about the employer's "free-
dom to manage its own affairs," placed the emphasis on whether
there was "a change in basic operating procedure .... [or] a
change in the capital structure." 56 The Supreme Court left this
conflict unresolved. More recently, the Labor Board has appar-
ently retreated from its former position, joining the courts in
11 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
52404 U.S. at 188.53 See, e.g., Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1963) (terminating a department and subcontracting its work); Ozark Trail-
ers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (closing one plant ofa multiplant enterprise).
54 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 224 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
51 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576 (1965) (subcontracting of both
maintenance and manufacturing operations).
56 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, II1 (8th Cir. 1965). cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966) (termination of distribution operations).
WINTER 1973]
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stressing the employer's "freedom to manage" and viewing a
"major change in the nature of the ... business" as a nonman-
datory subject.5 7 A sign that the Supreme Court is now prepared
to adopt the Nixon Board's view may be found in Justice Bren-
nan's cryptic remark in Pittsburgh Plate:
This is not to say that application of Oliver and Fibreboard
turns only on the impact of the third-party matter on employ-
ee interests. Other considerations, such as the effect on the
employer's freedom to conduct his business, may be equally
importantP8
Pittsburgh Plate is also important for its confirmation of the
famous (or infamous) mandatory-permissive dichotomy first ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in the Borg-Warner case.59 The
notion that bargaining topics should be classified into those on
which one party must bargain at the behest of the other, under
pain of violating Subsection 8(a)(5) for a refusal, and into those on
which one party cannot insist upon bargaining unless the other
agrees, under pain of violating Subsection 8(a)(5) for insisting, has
been much criticized by divers critics.60 The objections are vari-
ous, and, in my judgment, generally well-founded. The mandato-
ry-permissive categorization enables a federal administrative
agency and ultimately the courts to wield too much power in
determining what American employers and unions will bargain
about; it tends to freeze collective bargaining in outworn molds; it
establishes a uniform rule of law when the practices of different
industries may call for quite different treatment; and it leads to
duplicitous negotiations, as the parties create artificial deadlocks
over mandatory subjects in order to win concessions on per-
missive subjects they could not demand directly. Moreover, it
ignores the industrial reality that economic strength, not legal
maneuvering, will eventually decide the content of most labor
agreements anyway.
Any one of several possible alternatives would seem preferable
to Borg-Warner in my eyes. The mandatory-permissive dis-
tinction could be retained, but Borg-Warner overruled in its hold-
ing that insistence on a permissive topic is equivalent to a refusal
to bargain. Under this approach, only refusals to bargain over
57 Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1400 (1972) (termina-
tion of manufacturing operation).
58 404 U.S. at 179 n. 19 (citation omitted).
5 9 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
60 See, e.g., Cox, The Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term
1957, in ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW-1958 PROCEEDINGS 12, 30-40;
Christensen, New Subjects and New Concepts in Collective Bargaining, in ABA SECTION
OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW- 1970 PROCEEDINGS 245.
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mandatory subjects would violate Subsection 8(a)(5). Or all sub-
jects that any party wished to put on the table (excluding, of
course, unlawful proposals) could be considered mandatory in the
sense that the Labor Board would enforce the duty to bargain
about them. Or (and this last is a suggestion I feel we may not be
able to evaluate properly without more facts) all subjects would
be considered mandatory, but the NLRB could withhold its pro-
cesses in its discretion after a viable collective bargaining relation-
ship was established. The idea behind this last proposal is that
meaningful negotiations are more often impeded than aided by the
parties' knowledge that they can make the filing of 8(a)(5) charges
part of their bargaining tactics.
One of the shrewdest management attorneys I know thought
that Borg-Warner should have made the argument that all lawful
proposals are mandatory bargaining subjects, despite the obvious
point that this expansive reading of Subsection 8(d) would on its
face seem to benefit unions more than employers. My friend's
position was that the major problem for an employer is not nego-
tiating over an item the union wants to place on the table; it is
being caught in the trap of unilaterally changing something the
employer believed wasn't mandatory and subsequently learning
from the Labor Board that it was. This employer lawyer reasoned
that over time the general trend would be to extend the scope of
mandatory subjects, and thus he felt it was better to end the
uncertainty and the risk of the unilateral action trap by making
everything mandatory once and for all. "Then I'll know in ad-
vance exactly what I have to bargain about," he concluded, "and
the outcome will depend on negotiating skill and economic power,
which is the way it ought to be."
Another solution is suggested by my learned friend and es-
teemed successor as Section Secretary, Dave Feller.61 He points
out that the NLRB has assumed without analysis that the man-
datory-permissive distinction should apply in the same way both
in the negotiating situation and in the unilateral action situation.
At least one other possibility is that all matters any party wished
to bring to the table would have to be bargained about, but since
this concept could indeed impede employer flexibility if extended
to unilateral action, employers would still be able to introduce
changes with regard to certain matters, akin to those now labeled
permissive, in the absence of a union request for bargaining. I
agree that the Board's premise is an unexamined one, and yet it
seems to have been confirmed without discussion in Pittsburgh
61 Professor David E. Feller of the University of California School of Law, Berkeley.
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Plate. In deciding that the employer did not violate Subsection
8(a)(5) by offering the retirees a substitute for their benefits under
the group health plan, the Supreme Court apparently accepted the
notion of a parallelism between the matters on which bargaining
can be required and the matters which cannot be the subject of a
unilateral change. There was no hint that the scope of mandatory
bargaining might be different in the two different contexts. The
Court thus unfortunately continues its tradition of inadequately
reasoned lawmaking in the vital area of duty to bargain.
III. CENTRAL HARDWARE AND UNION ACCESS
The ancient conflict between an employer's property rights and
a union's right to proselytize came to the fore again in the Central
Hardware case. 62 Central Hardware owned and operated two
retail stores located in large buildings surrounded on three sides
by parking lots. The parking lots were maintained solely for the
use of Central's customers and employees. There were other
retail establishments with separate parking facilities in the vicin-
ity, but the various stores were not part of a shopping center
complex. A union began an organizational campaign at both of
Central's stores. The campaign consisted largely of the solic-
itation of Central's employees by nonemployee union organizers
on the employer's parking lots. When Central had a union organ-
izer arrested for violating a company no-solicitation rule, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges.
The NLRB63 and later a court of appeals6 4 ordered the employ-
er to cease enforcement of its no-solicitation rule, on the ground
the situation was controlled by the Logan Valley Plaza case.6 In
Logan Valley the Supreme Court had held that a union's organ-
izational picketing of a retailer in a shopping center open to the
public was protected under the first amendment. But in Central
Hardware the Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, reversed and
remanded, holding that Logan Valley was inapplicable and that
the proper guide to decision was NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co. 66 Babcock did not deal with constitutional rights but with the
Section 7 rights of employees under the NLRA to carry on
organizational activities on an employer's premises. It laid down
the rule that an employer is entitled, as master of his property, to
62 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
63 Central Hardware Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 491 (1970).
64 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
65 Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
66351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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exclude nonemployee union organizers from his premises as long
as there are reasonably available alternative means of commu-
nicating with the employees. The Court in Central Hardware
therefore sent the case back to the court of appeals to consider
the availability of alternative channels of communication. 7
Logan Valley is confined, said the Court, to those situations
where a private party has taken on certain attributes of a public
body.6 8 Generally, constitutional limitations apply only to state
action, or to equivalent action by private persons. Examples of
the latter are the operation of a "company town" 69 or, as in
Logan, of a large commercial shopping center that has sig-
nificantly displaced the functions of the normal municipal business
block.70 It was thus not enough that Central's parking lots were
"open to the public" in the sense that customers as well as
employees could use them. Otherwise, as the Court quite aptly
remarked, almost every retail and service establishment in the
country would become subject to constitutional restrictions, and
long-settled property rights would be infringed.
On their facts, Logan Valley Plaza and Central Hardware are
clearly distinguishable. Logan involved a shopping center com-
plex and Central only parking lots. At least for judges who wish
to sustain Logan Valley, Central Hardware presents no barriers.
But significantly Justice Marshall, the author of Logan, dissented
in Central and was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the case should
have been considered first under Babcock rather than under Lo-
gan. He believed, however, that before the Court decided wheth-
er the decision below was correct under the Constitution, it
should have remanded to the NLRB, rather than to the court of
appeals, for a specific ruling on the applicability of Babcock.71
Plainly, the Court was not of one mind in its solicitude for the
integrity of Logan.
Proper assessment of Central Hardware calls for examination
of a companion case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,72 involving
nonlabor activity in a shopping center. Again speaking through
Justice Powell, the Court limited Logan Valley by holding that
the first amendment does not prevent a privately owned shopping
center from forbidding the distribution of antiwar literature that is
67 407 U.S. at 548.
68 Id. at 547.
69 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
70391 U.S. at 319.
71 407 U.S. at 550.
72407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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unrelated to the shopping center's operations, at least where ade-
quate alternative means of communication exist. Justices Mar-
shall, Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart dissented.
Lloyd Corp. is a prime illustration of the venerable technique of
balancing competing interests in the resolution of constitutional
issues. What is noteworthy is the unaccustomed vigor with which
Justicd Powell asserts that property rights are entitled to a weight
on the scales equivalent to that of speech rights: "[T]he Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well
as the First Amendment rights of all citizens, must be respected
and protected." 73 It is true that antiwar literature may be said to
have much less "relation" than union propaganda to the purposes
for which a shopping center exists, and thus arguably the owner's
property rights are appropriately immune to the burden of the
former but not of the latter. In this way Logan Valley and Lloyd
Corp. can logically stand together. Even so, in light of Justice
Powell's powerful statements on behalf of property rights in
Lloyd, and in light of the dissent in that case by all four of the
surviving members of the Logan majority, 74 only the hardiest soul
would claim that Lloyd leaves Logan's vitality unimpaired. My
expectation is for the continuing limitation of Logan Valley in the
future.
Central Hardware and Lloyd Corp. dealt with solicitation and
the distribution of literature, not with picketing; Logan Valley was
a picketing case. We therefore can know nothing explicit, al-
though perhaps we can indulge in some surmise, about the atti-
tude of the Lloyd majority toward Logan's treatment of this
ambulatory form of propaganda. A broad dictum by Justice Mar-
shall in Logan Valley cut through the murk that has shrouded too
many Supreme Court opinions on this subject over the years, and
aroused hopes that the Court had at last devised a manageable
test for the constitutional right to picket. After making the ob-
vious point that the patrolling element in picketing permits it to be
regulated as conduct as well as speech, Justice Marshall went on
to stress the "purpose" of the picketing as the crucial factor in
determining whether it may constitutionally be prohibited or re-
stricted. The cases where bans on picketing have been upheld, he
stated,
involved picketing that was found either to have been di-
rected at an illegal end, . . . or to have been directed to coerc-
73 Id. at 570.
74 Justice White, the sole surviving dissenter in Logan Valley, was joined by all four
Nixon appointees to form the majority in Lloyd Corp.
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ing a decision by an employer which, although in itself legal,
could validly be required by the State to be left to the em-
ployer's free choice .... 75
That test, of course, still leaves hard questions to be answered.
But it has the great merit of focusing attention, as in other free
speech inquiries, on the content of the message, and not the form
it takes. 76 I should consider it regrettable if the doubt cast by
Lloyd on Logan Valley's balancing of free speech and property
rights, when the location of the communicator is the issue, should
carry over (as it may very well) to Justice Marshall's perceptive
words on the wholly different issue of the constitutional status of
picketing, regardless of its location.
IV. MISCELLANY
Burns, Pittsburgh Plate, and Central Hardware bulk much the
largest amidst the Supreme Court's production of labor decisions
during the past term. Nonetheless, there were eight other cases of
varying degrees of importance. To fulfill my reportorial mandate
and make my accounting complete, I shall say a brief word about
each of them.
A. Pipefitters Local 562 and Political Funds
In a decision of special significance in an election year, the
Supreme Court continued to render the Corrupt Practices Act all
but a dead letter as applied to union political activity. According
to Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 77 18 U.S.C. § 610 does
not forbid contributions or expenditures from voluntarily financed
union political funds. Reversing the convictions of a union and
three of its officers, the Court declared:
We hold that such a fund must be separate from the sponsor-
ing union only in the sense that there must be a strict segrega-
tion of its monies from union dues and assessments. We hold,
too, that, although solicitation by union officials is per-
missible, such solicitation must be conducted under circum-
stances plainly indicating that donations are for a political
75 391 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted).
7 See also Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas!-Amidst Confusion, A
Consistent Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956); St. Antoine, What Makes
Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS-PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW
5, 8- 12 (1965).
77407 U.S. 385 (1972).
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purpose and that those solicited may decline to contribute
without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal
within the union's institutional power.78
For the Court, the key to the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 610
was the belief that Congress intended to ensure the voluntariness
of union members' contributions, and not otherwise to inhibit the
exercise of union political power.
B. Nash-Finch and Preemption
Even in the absence of unfair labor practice charges before it,
the NLRB may now seek federal injunctive relief against preemp-
ted state court action. In NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,79 the Su-
preme Court sustained the power of the Board to ask a federal
court to enjoin a state court injunction against peaceful picketing,
despite the usual prohibitions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 against federal
injunctions to stay state court proceedings, and despite the failure
of the company involved to file Subsection 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7)
charges against the union. Since the Board had no basis for
requesting a Subsection 10(j) or 10(1) injunction, the express
exception in Section 2283 permitting a federal court to enjoin
state proceedings "in aid of its jurisdiction" was not applicable.
But in order "to prevent frustration of the policies of the Act," the
Board was held to have "an implied authority," as a federal
agency, "to enjoin state action where its federal power preempts
the field."-8 0
The holding of Nash-Finch is noteworthy because it gives the
Labor Board a powerful weapon with which to combat what had
previously been the practical omnipotence of certain in-
junction-wielding state trial judges. But the implications of the
decision may be even more noteworthy. For the Burger Court,
Nash-Finch reflects an unwonted hospitableness toward the doc-
trine of federal preemption. Only Justice White, in dissent, was
openly prepared to pursue the notion espoused two years ago in
Ariadne81 that only labor activity determined to be "actually,
rather than arguably, protected under federal law should be im-
mune from state judicial control." Perhaps the challenge posed by
7 8 id. at 414 (footnote omitted).
79404 U.S. 138 (1971).
80 Id. at 142-43.
81 Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 202 (1970)
(White, J., concurring).
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Ariadne to Garmon8 2 will subside, and Justice Harlan's wise
valedictory on preemption in Lockridge 3 will prevail.
C. Flair Builders and Arbitration
Further evidence of the Supreme Court's regard for the arbi-
tration process was supplied by Operating Engineers Local 150 v.
Flair Builders, Inc.8 4 The Court held that whether a union griev-
ance is barred by "laches" is a question for the arbitrator to
decide under a broad arbitration clause applicable to "any
difference" not settled by the parties within forty-eight hours of
the occurrence. This is true even if the claim of laches is consid-
ered "extrinsic" to the arbitral procedures under the agreement.
D. Plasterers and Scrivener: No Surprises
A union's gallant if quixotic effort to overturn twenty-five years
of unbroken Labor Board administrative practice came finally to
nought in Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB.8 5 Reversing a court of
appeals, the Supreme Court held that employers with substantial
financial stakes in the outcome of Subsection 10(k) proceedings
were "parties to the dispute" within the meaning of the section.
The NLRB was therefore empowered to determine the jurisdic-
tional dispute under Subsection 10(k), where only the unions, and
not the employers, had agreed upon a voluntary method of adjust-
ment. The unions were not allowed to settle the matter between
themselves, without employer participation.
Another case where the surprises (and the importance) would
have lain only in the decision's going the other way was NLRB v.
Scrivener.86 Even so, it was necessary to battle on up to the
Supreme Court for a ruling that an employer violated Subsection
8(a)(4) by discharging employees for giving written sworn state-
ments to a Board field examiner investigating unfair labor practice
charges against the employer, even though the employees had not,
in the literal language of the statute, "filed charges or given
testimony" in a formal hearing.
82 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (establishing
the "arguably protected or prohibited" test).
8 Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971)
(reaffirming Garmon).
84406 U.S. 487 (1972).
84404 U.S. 116 (1971).
8 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
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E. One Each Under the LMRDA, Title VII, and the RLA
Rounding out this report are three procedural decisions, one
each under Landrum-Griffin, Title VII, and the Railway Labor
Act.
In Trbovich v. UMW,8 7 the Supreme Court held that a union
member who filed the initial election complaint with the Secretary
of Labor may intervene in the Secretary's action to set aside the
election under Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.88 Intervention is confined, however, to the claims
of illegality presented by the Secretary's complaint. While agree-
ing that the Secretary's suit is the exclusive remedy, the Court
said: "There is no evidence whatever that Congress was opposed
to participation by union members in the litigation, so long as that
participation did not interfere with the screening and centralizing
functions of the Secretary." 89
The Court continued to clear the path for civil rights claimants
by brushing aside procedural objections based on mere technical-
ities. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a state agency that
is authorized to deal with employment discrimination must be
given the opportunity to process a charge before it is filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; charges must be
filed with the EEOC within a specified time following the com-
mencement or termination of the state proceedings. 90 In Love v.
Pullman Co.,91 the Court ruled that the statutory requirements
were met if the EEOC, upon receiving a complaint, orally referred
it to the appropriate state agency, suspended action until the state
body could decide what to do, and then treated the complaint as
formally filed once the state agency indicated it would not act. No
further filing with the EEOC by the aggrieved party was neces-
sary.
Finally, the Supreme Court laid an old ghost to rest in Andrews
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.9 2 In Republic Steel Corp. v. Mad-
dox,93 the Court had held that ordinarily an employee must ex-
haust the grievance and arbitration procedures available under a
collective bargaining agreement before he may resort to the
courts, specifically, in this instance, for the enforcement of sev-
87 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
88 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
89404 U.S. 532-33.
9042 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (c) (1970).
91404 U.S. 522 (1972).
92406 U.S. 320 (1972).
93 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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erance claims. Maddox, decided under the Taft-Hartley Act9 4 left
a cloud over Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.,9 5 which had ruled
that an employee did not have to exhaust his administrative re-
medies under the Railway Labor Act 96 before suing for wrongful
discharge. Andrews formally overruled Moore,97 thus aligning the
Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts on the exhaustion of re-
medies principle. Consistency undoubtedly does not rank high in
today's hierarchy of jurisprudential values, but it counts for some-
thing, and we may as well give some small thanks to see it
manifested here.
V. CONCLUSION
Sir Frederick Pollock once declared: "Caution and valour are
both needed for the fruitful constructive interpretation of legal
principles."98 A few years ago, in assessing the work of the
Warren Court, I commented that many observers would conclude
that it was more conspicuous for "valour" than for "caution." I
added that if a choice had to be made between the two, I thought
"valour" the more appropriate quality to bring to the regulation of
so dynamic a field as labor relations. The Burger Court apparently
feels otherwise. I concede that it may be too much to ask of any
single Court that it maintain an ideal balance between boldness
and circumspection, and that successive adjustments may be the
best we can hope for. After a decade and a half of forays into new
terrain behind the clarion call of "valour," perhaps it is time for a
bit of retrenchment under the more modest banner of "caution."
94 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
95 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
9645 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
97 406 U.S. at 326.
98 Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour, in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 367, 373 (Bar
Ass'n of the City of New York ed. 1953).
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